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February 17, 2017

### Via ECFS

Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary Federal Communications Commission 445 12th Street, SW Washington, DC 20554

Re: Ex Parte Filing of the American Cable Association on the Connect America Fund, WC Docket No. 10-90

Dear Ms. Dortch:

On February 16, 2017, Ross Lieberman, Senior Vice President of Government Affairs, American Cable Association ("ACA"), Micah Sachs and Anne Gillard, Cartesian (by telephone), and Thomas Cohen, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, Counsel to ACA, met with Jay Schwarz, Wireline Advisor to Chairman Pai, and Lisa Hone, Ryan Palmer, Alexander Minard, Heidi Lankau, and Katie King of the Wireline Competition Bureau. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the analysis ACA undertook to develop a methodology to weight bids in the Connect America Fund ("CAF") Phase II competitive bidding process (or auction)<sup>1</sup> that, by being technology neutral, would ensure significant and proportional auction participation by all providers.<sup>2</sup> By enabling maximum participation, bidding would be most competitive, and funding would be distributed most cost-efficiently, providing the public with the greatest return.

Connect America Fund et al., WC Docket No. 10-90 et al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 16-64, ¶¶ 205-229 (rel. May 26, 2016) ("CAF Phase II Auction Order"). See also id., ¶¶ 14-18.

ACA's proposed weighting methodology is contained in a January 30, 2017 ex parte filing. *See* Letter from Thomas Cohen, Counsel to American Cable Association, to Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Jan. 30, 2017).

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ACA representatives explained that its analysis examines the clustering of weighted cost-effectiveness ratios for all bids – winning and losing – across all eligible areas, assuming participants bid their cost to serve.<sup>3</sup> Its analysis also leverages a comprehensive data set, and its data set and analysis account for the huge variability in costs of deployment due to housing density. In contrast, the analysis and data used in submissions by other interested parties are severely flawed because they assume a single cost benchmark for each technology<sup>4</sup> – or worse, rely on hypothetical bid numbers.<sup>5</sup>

Applying ACA's analysis and data to the various proposed methodologies, it is readily apparent, by examining the clustering of cost-based bids, that the weighting methodology proposed by US Telecom and the "draft" Commission methodology will not maximize participation by all potential providers using all technologies; instead they unduly favor one or a limited number of technologies and certain census blocks. The Rural Coalition's methodology fares somewhat better, but it too will not drive the most cost-effective outcome. On the other hand, ACA's proposed weighting methodology will produce the tightest clustering of bids, ensuring that the funding is allocated most cost-effectively. Moreover, if all participants simply bid at their cost to serve, ACA's weighting methodology also would lead to full coverage of

The Commission's system for prioritizing bids operates by ranking bids for all eligible areas, prioritizing those with highest weighted cost-effectiveness ratios. See CAF Phase II Auction Order,  $\P$  210.

To ensure maximum auction participation, a weighting methodology should account for the fact that bidders may compete for funds against other bidders in their bid areas and may compete for funds against bidders in other areas. It also should take into account that providers will only participate if they believe they have a reasonable chance of winning. Thus, a successful weighting methodology should produce the tightest spread of weighted cost-effectiveness ratios across all technologies and geographies.

- The US Telecom submission, which cites to data submitted by Southern Tier Wireless, is an example of an analysis utilizing single cost benchmarks without accounting for housing density. *See* Letter from Jonathan Banks, on behalf of US Telecom, to Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90 (February 10, 2017) ("US Telecom Ex Parte"); Letter from Geoffrey G. Why, on behalf of Southern Tier Wireless, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket Nos. 10-90, 14-58 and 14-259 (Sept. 21, 2016).
- See Letter from Stephen E. Coran, Counsel to the Wireless Internet Service Providers Association, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90, 14-58 and 14-259 (Jan. 31, 2017).

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eligible census blocks without exhausting the full amount of support available – approximately \$2 billion (with support for New York removed).<sup>6</sup>

In the following section, ACA first sets forth its analytical framework in detail and then applies that framework to each of the proposed weighting methodologies.

## **ACA's Analytical Framework**

To establish the fact base for its analysis, ACA's external consulting firm Cartesian modeled the cost to serve for the technologies that can serve each performance tier: <sup>7</sup> fiber-to-the-home ("FTTH") for Gigabit and Above-Baseline, <sup>8</sup> brownfield DSL for Baseline and Minimum, <sup>9</sup> fixed wireless for Baseline, and satellite for Minimum with High Latency and Baseline with High Latency. <sup>10</sup>

See Connect America Fund et al., WC Docket No. 10-90 et al., Order, FCC 17-2 (rel. Jan. 26, 2017) ("CAF New York Order").

- Both Gigabit and Above Baseline could be provided by either FTTH or DOCSIS running over hybrid-fiber coax ("HFC") plant. However, for greenfield builds, the cost of build-out for either FTTH or HFC is effectively equivalent because the great majority of new plant build-out costs come from labor to deploy fiber rather than equipment. Indeed, service providers who traditionally offer broadband over HFC often build out FTTH when building in totally new areas. *See Ex Parte* Filing by 40 Smaller Cable Operators, to Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Feb. 16, 2017). Therefore, ACA assumes that almost all Gigabit or Above Baseline bids will be submitted by providers planning to build using FTTH technology. ACA therefore also assumes that Above Baseline will rarely have a cost advantage over Gigabit.
- ACA assumes that no operator will build a greenfield DSL network, as the build-out cost is similar to a greenfield FTTH network, which can provide far greater performance at a lower operating cost. Given the widespread availability of DSL technology even in rural areas, ACA assumes that many bids for Baseline and Minimum will be based on brownfield DSL, leveraging existing copper lines, cabinets, DSLAMs and other equipment. For higher speed DSL (Baseline tier), ACA assumes providers will need to push fiber closer to the network edge.
- ACA disputes that satellite can serve Baseline with High Latency, as no US satellite broadband provider currently publicly offers 25/3 Mbps with a data cap of at least 150 GB. See <a href="https://www.hughesnet.com/get-started">https://www.hughesnet.com/get-started</a>, <a href="https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/">https://www.hughesnet.com/get-started</a>, <a href="https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.infinitydish.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.exede.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.exede.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.exede.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.exede.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/plan-results/liberty12/</a>, and <a href="https://www.exede.com/dishnet">https://www.exede.com/dishnet</a>.

Comprehensive documentation of the data points used and modeling can be found in Appendix I.

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Cartesian then applied the four proposed weighting methodologies – US Telecom, Rural Coalition, "draft" Commission, and ACA – to each technology in each eligible census block to determine the weighted cost-effectiveness ratio for all potential bids, assuming auction participants bid at their modeled cost to serve. The weighted cost-effectiveness ratios of all potential bids for each census block were then ranked from lowest to highest to determine the order of priority for awarding support.<sup>11</sup>

## **Proposed Weighting Methodologies**

Performance Tier	USTA	Rural Coalition	Draft FCC	ACA
Gigabit	0%	0%	0%	0%
Above Baseline	5%	30%	20%	15%
Baseline	15%	60%	40%	75%
Minimum	25%	70%	60%	80%
Higher Latency (regardless of speed)	25%	25%	25%	15%

included satellite at the Baseline tier with high latency due to the letter from Hughes implying they will bid at that level. *See* Letter from Jennifer A. Manner, Counsel to Hughes, to Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90 (February 14, 2017) ("Hughes Ex Parte").

Weighted cost-effectiveness ratios are not simply the (bid price) / (reserve price). They are by definition weighted using the weighting penalties associated with each tier proposed by the various weighting methodologies. So they are calculated in the following way: ((bid price) + (performance tier weighting) \* (reserve price)) / (reserve price). US Telecom and the Rural Coalition follow the same approach. *See US Telecom Ex Parte. See also* Letter from Rebekah Goodheart to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Feb. 14, 2017) (reporting on *ex parte* meetings by Rural Coalition members).

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To determine the level of clustering, Cartesian analyzed the distribution of all cost-based bids across all geographies, under the presumption that providers will only participate if they believe they have a reasonable chance of winning against other likely bidders. The more tightly bids are clustered, particularly those between the 10<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of all bids, the more likely that the vast majority of providers will believe they have a reasonable chance to win. Additionally, to provide another means of measuring clustering, Cartesian plotted the weighted cost-effectiveness ratio of the highest winning bid for each methodology to determine how far the weighted cost-effectiveness ratio of a bid at the 90th percentile is from the ratio for the highest winning bid. Finally, Cartesian evaluated for each methodology where each technology fell across the range of cost-based bids. This analysis allows one to forecast which technologies are more or less likely to used by bidders under each methodology, and among those technologies that are used by bidders, which are best positioned to win. Additionally and the strength of the distribution of all cost-based bids.

## Application of ACA's Analytical Framework to Proposed Weighting Methodologies

After applying ACA's analytical framework to the various weighting methodologies (see table below), it is clear that neither US Telecom's nor the "draft" Commission's weighting methodologies produce tight clustering of weighted cost-effectiveness ratios. US Telecom's proposal produces a wide range of 31 percentage points from the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile of all bids to the

Cartesian looked at the median 80 percent of bids, eliminating the top 10 percent and bottom 10 percent of locations so as to account for any "long tail" effect. This median 80 percent is used whenever we refer to the "range" or "distribution." This is another way of saying the clustering analysis ignored bids below the 10<sup>th</sup> percentile and above the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of all bids.

The highest winning bid is the maximum weighted cost-effectiveness ratio that would still win a census block assuming every technology bids its actual cost to serve. In other words, it is the last cost-based bid that would win before all location would be served or all funding would be disbursed. Any bidder with a higher weighted cost-effectiveness ratio than the highest winning bidder's ratio would lose.

While none of the methodologies favor FTTH at the Gigabit or Above Baseline tier, encouraging bidders that utilize FTTH would greatly expand the pool of bidders. Potential FTTH bidders include cable operators (552 holding companies utilizing cable modem technology, according to analysis of December 2015 Form 477 data), rate of return local exchange carriers (at least 650, according to a recent FCC posting) and electric co-ops (the National Rural Electrical Co-op Association has 900 members). *See* <a href="http://transition.fcc.gov/form477/BroadbandData/Fixed/Dec15/Version%202/US-Fixed-with-Satellite-Dec2015.zip">http://transition.fcc.gov/form477/BroadbandData/Fixed/Dec15/Version%202/US-Fixed-with-Satellite-Dec2015.zip</a>, <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/ACAM\_231\_Summary\_CAFBLS\_oblig\_102016\_Final.xls">https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/ACAM\_231\_Summary\_CAFBLS\_oblig\_102016\_Final.xls</a> x and <a href="https://www.electric.coop/our-organization/">https://www.electric.coop/our-organization/</a>.

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90<sup>th</sup> percentile of all bids, and the "draft" Commission's range is 38 percentage points. By creating such large potential gaps between bids, the US Telecom and "draft" Commission proposals will especially lessen the incentive for many bidders with higher weighted cost-effectiveness ratios to participate, such as those in the 70-80 percent or 80-90 percent decile. The Rural Coalition's methodology produces somewhat better clustering, with a range of 20 percentage points. By contrast, ACA's proposed methodology produces the tightest clustering of weighted cost-effectiveness ratios of all the proposals: 14 percentage points. Additionally, ACA's methodology produces the tightest range between the highest winning bid and the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of all bids, at 10 percentage points.


# Weighting Methodologies: Clustering Analysis Summary<sup>15</sup>

	US Telecom	Rural Coalition	Draft FCC	ACA
Range in Bids Between 10th and 90th Percentile of Bids	31%	20%	37%	14%
Range in Bids Between Highest Winning Bid and 90 <sup>th</sup> Percentile of Bids	27%	18%	35%	10%

The following charts, which plot the distribution of bids by technology for each of the proposals, show how particular technologies fare under each proposal:


<sup>15</sup> Charts illustrating overall distribution of bids can be found in Appendix II.

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


This chart demonstrates that US Telecom's proposal is not technology neutral. It strongly favors fixed wireless, as shown by the clustering of fixed wireless above the highest winning bid's weighted cost-effectiveness ratio of 41 percent. It also illustrates how satellite "10/1" and DSL "10/1" are not close to the highest winning bid's ratio. Further, it illustrates how bids for FTTH effectively stand no chance of prevailing, as shown by the purple spike at 100 percent weighted cost-effectiveness ratio. With little chance of winning, FTTH bidders would have little incentive to participate. Regardless of the theoretical merits of the different weighting approaches, US Telecom's proposed weighting methodology will so disadvantage bidders at the Gigabit and Above Baseline tiers that their participation in the auction will be, at best, *de minimis*.

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
The Rural Coalition proposal produces fairly tight clustering in the median 80 percent of bids. Nonetheless, FTTH is outside the median 80 percent of bids, sending a signal to FTTH providers that their chances of winning are fairly remote.



The "draft" Commission proposal produces a wider distribution of bids than any other proposal. While fixed wireless, satellite "25/3," DSL "25/3," and to a lesser extent DSL "10/1" are competitive, both satellite "10/1" and FTTH are greater than 20 percentage points distant

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from the highest winning bid's ratio of 65 percent. Bidders using either technology will have little incentive to participate in the auction.



ACA's proposal produces both a tight spread among the median 80 percent of bids and enables all technologies to have a reasonable chance of prevailing. FTTH bids are within 4 percentage points of the highest winning bid's weighted cost-effectiveness ratio of 96 percent. Even DSL "25/3" can offer a majority of bids within the median 80 percent and within 10 percentage points of the highest winning bid's ratio. Additionally, as discussed above, ACA's proposal would fund all locations within the Phase II budget, assuming only that all bidders bid at their cost to serve.

In sum, ACA's proposal is more competitive and technologically neutral, thereby encouraging bids by more providers deploying different types of networks. Thus, ACA submits that its approach, as demonstrated by the evidence provided herein, best serves the public interest.

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This letter is being filed electronically pursuant to Section 1.1206 of the Commission's rules.

Sincerely,

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## Appendix I

## **Modeling Cost to Serve by Technology**

To model the costs for each technology, Cartesian used a range of sources, including submissions to the Commission's Rural Broadband Experiment ("RBE"). For FTTH and brownfield DSL providing Baseline performance, Cartesian developed cost curves based on housing density, utilizing data points from the Rural Broadband Experiment and other public and proprietary sources. For fixed wireless, Cartesian developed a cost curve based on a limited set of data points, informed by the knowledge that fixed wireless can more cost-effectively serve lightly populated areas due to the long-range propagation qualities of spectrum. For brownfield DSL providing Minimum performance, it assumed that upgrades to existing DSL networks could be provided solely through electronics upgrades (*e.g.* bonding and vectoring) and therefore costs would not be highly sensitive to housing density. To determine these costs, it used an average of RBE submissions that sought to provide DSL upgrades primarily through electronics upgrades. Finally, for satellite, it assumed very low bids that do not change with housing density due to the minimal incremental costs associated with serving additional homes with satellite broadband and satellites' near-universal US coverage areas.

For technologies that are sensitive to housing density, Cartesian developed cost curves by plotting known build-out cost data points against the housing density (housing units/square mile) for the geographies associated with each data point. Cartesian then developed "best fit" cost curves that associated a unique cost per home passed with a given housing density. These "best fit" cost curves were then used to predict the cost per home passed for each CAF auction-eligible census block, based on their housing density. <sup>18</sup>

For a general overview of the RBE, see <a href="https://www.fcc.gov/general/rural-broadband-experiments">https://www.fcc.gov/general/rural-broadband-experiments</a>. For a summary of awarded RBE bids, see <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/RBEOverviewChart5\_4\_2016.xlsx">https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/RBEOverviewChart5\_4\_2016.xlsx</a>. For a list of RBE expressions of interest, see <a href="http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs\_public/attachmatch/DOC-326765A1.xlsx">https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs\_public/attachmatch/DOC-326765A1.xlsx</a>.

Best fit curves were generated using the number of locations served and total cost per location across fiber, fixed wireless, and Baseline performance brownfield DSL technologies.

The Wireline Competition Bureau released a preliminary list of eligible census blocks and location data in August 2016, which included a total 1,492,414 locations, available at <a href="https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/Prelim\_Phase\_II\_Auction\_Eligible\_CBs\_081016.zip">https://transition.fcc.gov/wcb/Prelim\_Phase\_II\_Auction\_Eligible\_CBs\_081016.zip</a>. For its analysis, Cartesian excluded all New York census blocks in the list due to the Commission's recent decision to award the state of New York \$170 million in 10-year

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For technologies that are not sensitive to housing density, Cartesian used rounded averages of existing cost per home passed data points.

The formulas used for each technology are described below, followed by tables and graphs outlining the data points and associated cost curves:

<b>Performance Tier</b>	Technology	Formulas
		(x = Location-Density)
Gigabit & Above Baseline	Fiber	$y = 18635 * x ^ -0.529$
Baseline	Fixed Wireless	$y = 5209.1 * x ^ -0.62$
Baseline	Brownfield DSL *25/3*	$y = 6718.7 * x ^-0.596$
Baseline & High Latency	Satellite *25/3*	y = 200
Minimum	Brownfield DSL *10/1*	y = 600
Minimum & High Latency	Satellite *10/1*	y = 100

funding from the CAF Phase II Reverse Auction fund to cover all auction-eligible locations in New York. *See CAF New York Order*.

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## Fiber-to-the-Home ("FTTH")<sup>19</sup>

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$1,623	ETC Communications, LLC <sup>20</sup>	43.94
\$1,481	Great Western Alliance	38.51
	Group Inc <sup>21</sup>	
\$3,376	TV Service, Inc. <sup>22</sup>	19.65
\$4,955	Callaway Electric	19.60
	Cooperative <sup>23</sup>	

<sup>19</sup> The FTTH greenfield cost-curve was generated using of RBE Expressions of Interest for fiber in new census tracts, where the proposing operator had no presence. Relatively few operators have existing fiber deployments in or near these high-cost areas; so this filter provides the most appropriate evaluation of costs most operators can expect. While the primary source for fiber cost density data is RBE Expressions of Interest, supplemental benchmarks at higher densities from internal projects and public data from large industry players like Google Fiber, CenturyLink, and the NTIA were also used. For examples, see Jay Yarow, "It's Surprisingly Inexpensive For Google To Build Its Cable-Destroying" Google Fiber Network," Business Insider (Apr. 8, 2013), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cost-of-building-google-fiber-2013-4; Ingrid Lunden, "Analyst: Google Will Spend \$84M Building Out KC's Fiber Network To 149K Homes; \$11B If It Went Nationwide," TechCrunch (Apr. 8, 2013), available at https://techcrunch.com/2013/04/08/google-fiber-cost-estimate/; "Even After Omaha, Communities Cannot Count on CenturyLink For Connectivity," Community Networks (May 3, 2013), available at https://muninetworks.org/content/even-after-omahacommunities-cannot-count-centurylink-connectivity; and Public Utility District of Pend Oreille County, Quarterly Performance Progress Report for Broadband Infrastructure Projects (Aug. 27, 2013), available at http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/files/grantees/nt10bix5570059 public utility district of pend oreille county ppr2013 q2.pdf.

See ETC Communications, LLC Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Feb. 28, 2014).

See Great Western Alliance Group, Inc. d/b/a Cableview Communications Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 10, 2014).

See TV Service, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

See Callaway Electric Cooperative Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

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\$3,965	Barry Electric Cooperative <sup>24</sup>	15.02
\$5,500	UNS Energy Corporation (UNS) <sup>25</sup>	14.64
\$4,950	Callaway - Consolidated - Kingdom <sup>26</sup>	13.96
\$1,900	UNS Energy Corporation (UNS) <sup>27</sup>	13.23
\$3,500	Boycom Cablevision Inc. <sup>28</sup>	12.21
\$4,952	Consolidated Electric Cooperative <sup>29</sup>	10.62
\$4,441	South Central Alabama Broadband Cooperative District <sup>30</sup>	10.19
\$10,323	Plumas-Sierra Rural Electric Cooperative & Telecommunications <sup>31</sup>	5.38

See Barry Electric Cooperative Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

See UNS Energy Corporation Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See Callaway Electric Cooperative, Consolidated Electric Cooperative, and Kingdom Technology Services, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

See See UNS Energy Corporation Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See Boycom Cablevision Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

See Consolidated Electric Cooperative Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).


See South Central Alabama Broadband Cooperative District Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See Plumas-Sierra Rural Electric Cooperative & Telecommunications Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 5, 2014).

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\$20,000	Southern Montana Telephone Company <sup>32</sup>	3.72
\$55,556	Southern Montana Telephone Company <sup>32</sup>	0.32
\$560	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	306.97
\$667	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	879.50
\$636	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	879.50
\$625	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	879.50
\$615	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	500.00
\$658	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	500.00
\$564	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	1206.00
\$667	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	806.00
\$500	REDACTED <sup>33</sup>	1661.00

# **Fiber Greenfield Density Deployment Costs**



See Southern Montana Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Cartesian proprietary benchmarks from internal projects.

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## Fixed Wireless<sup>34</sup>

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$2,000	Allamakee-Clayton Electric Cooperative, Inc. <sup>35</sup>	5.00
\$1,000	First Step Internet, LLC <sup>36</sup> & Skybeam, LLC <sup>37</sup>	15.00
\$500	Oznet Solutions <sup>38</sup>	50.00

<sup>34</sup> Cartesian used benchmarked assumptions for low, medium, and high fixed wireless bids to generate a cost-curve, as there were a limited number of fixed wireless RBE proposals available. Two of the three fixed wireless funded proposals—and the only two purefixed-wireless funded proposals, which provide the most direct insight into what the FCC considers an appropriate cost for fixed wireless technology without fiber—cost approximately \$1,000 per location (First Step Internet, LLC & Skybeam, LLC). This was used as our medium bid. The high bid was benchmarked with the RBE Funded Proposals Summary—the highest cost per location of an approved fixed wireless proposal was approximately \$2,185, from Allamakee-Clayton Electric Cooperative, Inc. This falls on the high end of the spectrum, as it employs hybrid fiber/fixed wireless, with fiber driving up the total cost per location served. Cartesian's research into RBE Expressions of Interest support this price point, with the majority of fixed wireless proposals that include fiber falling in the \$2,000-\$3,000 range – of seven fixed wireless proposals which incorporate fiber reviewed, six are within \$2,000-\$3,000 per location passed. The low bid was benchmarked in RBE Expressions of Interest. Two proposals constituted the lowest cost per location in the reviewed proposals. These proposals likely exclude certain costs, like backhaul, from their expressions of interest, which drives the price down. However, if these are not costs the operators expect to incur, their proposals represent the lowest viable costs. OzNet Solutions was \$406 per location and Santel Communications Cooperative, Inc. was \$447 per location.

See Allamakee-Clayton Electric Cooperative Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 5, 2014).

See First Step Internet, LLC Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 57, 2014).


See "Rural Broadband Experiment Support Authorized for Ten Winning Bids for Skybeam, LLC, Consolidated Communications Networks, Inc., Delta Communications, LLC, and Allamakee-Clayton Electric Cooperative, Inc.," WC Docket Nos. 10-90, 14-259, Public Notice, DA 15-987 (rel. Aug. 7, 2015).

See Ozarks Internet Solutions L.L.C. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

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Santel Communications	
Cooperative <sup>39</sup>	





See Santel Communications Cooperative, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

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## Brownfield DSL "25/3",40

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$261	Bruce Telephone Company <sup>41</sup>	9.74
\$1,535	Barry County Telephone Company <sup>42</sup>	34.49
\$1,908	Carr Telephone Company <sup>43</sup>	24.95
\$2,100	Fulton Telephone Company <sup>44</sup>	18.74
\$5,400	Range Telephone Cooperative, Inc. 45	1.17
\$462	Chester Telephone Company <sup>46</sup>	25.08
\$7,500	3 Rivers Communications <sup>47</sup>	1.59

The brownfield DSL cost-curve is generated from 10 RBE documents. Some data points used for DSL "10/1" are included here to better capture how providers in denser areas are more likely to leverage existing electronics rather than build new plant.

See Bruce Telephone Company, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See\_Barry County Telephone Company, MEl Telecom Services, and Lake Michigan Telephone Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 6, 2014).

See\_Carr Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 5, 2014).

See\_Fulton Telephone Company, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See\_Range Telephone Cooperative, Inc. Letter of Intent, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 5, 2014).


See\_Chester Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 3, 2014).

See\_3 Rivers Communications Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Feb. 7, 2014).

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\$688	Chickamauga Telephone	78.35
	Corporation <sup>48</sup>	
\$832	Waverly Hall Telephone	19.26
	Company <sup>49</sup>	
\$10,333	Matanuska Telephone	1.15
·	Company <sup>50</sup>	

# **DSL Brownfield Deployment Costs**



See\_Chickamauga Telephone Corporation Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

<sup>49</sup> See\_Waverly Hall Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

<sup>50</sup> See\_Matanuska Telephone Association, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

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## Satellite "25/3"

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$200	Hughes Satellite <sup>51</sup>	Not Applicable

## Brownfield DSL "10/1"

Of the 10 brownfield DSL RBE proposals observed, only four were deemed to rely exclusively on electronics upgrades, shown below. As can be seen, the cost per location actually goes down at lower densities, implying that location density is not the most influential factor in the pricing of these costs. The average cost per location between these was \$561, which for simplicity was rounded to \$600. ACA acknowledges that it is possible that some DSL "10/1" bids will require the laying of additional fiber and moving of DSLAMs closer to end-users.

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$261	Bruce Telephone Company <sup>52</sup>	9.74
\$462	Chester Telephone Company <sup>53</sup>	25.08
\$688	Chickamauga Telephone Corporation <sup>54</sup>	78.35
\$832	Waverly Hall Telephone Company <sup>55</sup>	19.26

## Satellite "10/1"

As discussed above, Hughes anticipates that the lower bound for satellite providers' bids' will be above \$185 per customer. For simplicity, Cartesian rounded to \$200. *See Hughes Ex Parte*.

<sup>52</sup> See Bruce Telephone Company, Inc. Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

<sup>53</sup> See Chester Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 3, 2014).

<sup>54</sup> See Chickamauga Telephone Corporation Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

See Waverly Hall Telephone Company Expression of Interest, WC Docket No. 10-90 (Mar. 7, 2014).

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
Since satellite is already available across almost all eligible areas – indeed, satellite providers HughesNet and Viasat market their services as being available anywhere in the U.S. – the incremental cost to serve a new location is effectively \$0. However, since no bidder is likely to bid \$0, Cartesian assumed a minimum bid per location of \$100 for all Minimum performance satellite bids.

Cost per Location	Source	<b>Location Density</b>
\$100	-	Not Applicable


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# **Appendix II: Distribution Curves for Different Weighting Methodologies**

# **US Telecom Proposal**




# **Rural Coalition Proposal**



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# **Draft FCC Proposal**



# **ACA Proposal**

